Back in May I came up with an idea for electoral reform. Since then I've been seeking input, looking for similar
electoral systems, and trying to judge what the public would think of SM-PV. In all three areas I have had a bit of success.
For those who didn't check out the link above my proposed system keeps most of the FPTP system intact with one key
change: every MP in the House of Commons would have a vote that is stronger or weaker based on their party's share of the popular vote. The result being that FPTP's tendency towards majority governments is preserved but the ability to pass
legislation would be tied to the government's share of the popular vote. If you want a more in depth look at how this
might work check out the link above.

I contacted Prof. Andrew Heard of Simon Fraser University after seeing his comments on electoral reform in the paper
one day. I specifically was looking for a critique of SM-PV. The Professor was happy to give a short reply:

The Professor raised a valid concern. While my system allows votes for parties that don't win seats (or regions) to still
help the voter's preferred party it doesn't help a party ensure regional representation. On one hand making sure every
region has MPs in both Her Majesty's Government as well as Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition is important for helping
parties understand regional concerns. But on the other hand perhaps a temporary shellacking acts as a wake up call to
parties that their policies in a region need a re-think. Rarely do such complete lockouts last for more than one election
cycle. Equally important are the other avenues the regions have to make their concerns known to the affected parties,
namely the provincial premiers and the (much maligned) Senate.

I am glad that Prof. Heard agrees that only having to change the weight of each MP's vote is an advantage. As I will show
​further down, Canadians agree.

When I first developed my current idea for electoral reform I searched around to see if anyone was developing similar
systems. At the time I didn't find anything. There are no legislatures that use weighted voting systems and most electoral
reform debates are between Ranked Vote and Proportional Representation. So it was exciting to stumble upon an effort
in Britain to establish a similar weighted voting system. Direct Party and Representative Voting (DPR) differs from
Single Member-Proportional Vote only in that DPR has voters choose both the candidate they support as well as the
party they support. The latter vote determines how the votes are weighted in the ensuing parliament. I'm not convinced
the extra ballot is strictly necessary. It also may create situations where the party that gets the most MPs is not the party
that people support the most. This has a few potential problems. However, Stephen Johnson has done a lot of the
​legwork of investigating how a weighted voting system would be advantageous which has been a great help to me. 

The Broadbent Institute recently sponsored a poll on how Canadians view electoral reform. There is a lot of
interesting findings (most of which I'm going to look at). 

Q: Based on what you know and feel about the way we elect members of Parliament, which of the following
statements comes closest to your view?

As you can see 58% are either okay with the current system or only want minor changes. SM-PV comes closest to
​meeting the preferences of a majority of Canadians.

When asked what 5 things Canadians valued in an electoral system they gave the below proportion of answers. I have
coloured red the values SM-PV does not help. I've marked one value in orange since while my system doesn't support
it that is because it by-passes the issue entirely.

As you can see SM-PV meets the main expectations Canadians have of their electoral system. The report makes one
​more interesting point in this section:

My system actually meets both criteria. I will note that the 'strong & stable' governments it produces are stable in their
ability to survive explicit confidence votes (Speech From The Throne, Budget, and Motion Of No Confidence). However,
their ability to pass legislation functions more like a minority government. When the results include only those who want
electoral reform the list ends up a bit different:

It should be noted that SM-PV only fails the top listed value on this list (and the last list for that matter) on a technical
basis. Why are seat totals matching popular vote such a concern? Because seat totals represent the ability to pass
legislation. In SM-PV this is instead taken care of by modifying voting power rather than seat totals.

The above graph was taken from those who want change. They were asked to rank four pre-selected systems in order
​of preference. Not surprisingly no weighted systems were considered. Of note is the preference for proportional systems
which SM-PV could technically be classified as. Also, note that our current system was the 2nd or 3rd choice 55% of the
time. It out-ranked each other system in this regard. Taken with the earlier graph that showed a majority only want
minor changes to the electoral system it can be argued that most Canadians would accept a modified FPTP system
​that adds proportionality. SM-PV, in other words. 

Much of the rest of the study looks at what the last election would look like under different electoral systems. This is an
easy process under SM-PV: The Liberal Party would have a stable majority government but have to consult the other
parties in order to pass their legislation.

SM-PV is likely one of the few contenders that both those who want electoral reform and those who don't would be
willing to accept. Should it get a proper hearing at the yet-announced electoral reform committee it will be interesting
​how the debate develops.

As a graduate of New Brunswick's education system I sometimes reflect on
the quality of the schooling I received. I also have a longstanding  interest in
Japanese culture. It is natural then that I would eventually get to looking at how
Japan does education. What I found was a school system that better instills the
values of leadership, sense of community, and respect than anything I've seen in
New Brunswick. I figured I may as well detail some of the highlights of their
system and make the argument that New Brunswick would do well to adopt at
least some of these policies. The policies are in no particular order of importance.

This is my third time trying to write on this topic and I've struggled with how to cover it. This is mostly because the ideas I
am advocating for are interconnected to a large degree. So doing one topic left a lot unsaid and doing the entire article
created an unreadable master's thesis. I settled on covering two topics in each article. Expect this series of articles to link
back to older articles and forward to newer ones (linear existence being more a suggestion than a rule). 

It seems appropriate when the government is cutting teaching positions to discuss how we might cut janitorial positions instead. In Japan it is common practice to have students do most of the cleaning in the school. This cleaning is usually scheduled after school each day. Usually the soji no jikan (the cleaning time) takes up 15 minutes to an hour. It has been tried out in some charter schools in the United States to great effect as well.

Some might balk at the idea of even a minute of potential class time going towards school cleaning. They may well argue that such cleaning has no educational value. I'd argue they are wrong. Being able to work together in a shared endeavor is an important skill to learn. Understanding that you have a responsibilities towards your community is a fundamental aspect of citizenship. It might even instill a bit of respect for people who clean as a profession. Students might even welcome the change since, as long as the work was getting done, there would be an opportunity to socialize.

Interestingly, having students clean produces a result that is perfectly logical in hindsight. Students tend not to write on school property with pens or markers since they may well be assigned that section to clean later. While there would still be a need for a few janitors for dangerous and difficult tasks the number needed would be much reduced. From a savings and educational stance this policy has a great deal of appeal.

This kind of thing has precedence in New Brunswick. My mother recalls that her school was cleaned once a week by the janitor and the students were expected to clean up after themselves during the week. It is time we revived this expectation.

Probably the biggest difference between teachers in New Brunswick and Japan is that in Japan the position has a certain level of prestige. Teachers are among the most highly paid civil servants in Japan and the hiring process is very selective. Most importantly teachers are able to teach in the subject they were trained in. Due to the number of teaching graduates the field is highly competitive and schools can afford to be picky. 

While Canada has a very sharp division between moral and academic education, Japan does not. Teachers are expected to be a stand-in for the child's parents at school and to instill moral values and help develop a child's character. Indeed, a teacher's influence often extends into the surrounding community. Teachers in Japan often work unpaid overtime and patrol local events with a eye out for misbehaving students. 

In class an observer might be surprised by how little direct discipline there is. An example I read about in Thunder From The East detailed how after a student started playing 'bombs away' with a carrot in the fish tank the teacher stated simply that the fish might get hurt. After a couple half-hearted attempts she gave up. However, after recess she brought up her concerns about dropping carrots into the fish tank with the class. This wasn't the lectures myself and many others have had to sit through. In fact the teacher said very little. Instead she asked the class what they should do about the situation. Some students noted the game was fun while others worried it might hurt the fish and they should stop. The teacher acknowledged the first group but encouraged and praised the second group. She then got the class as a whole to agree with the majority opinion; that 'bombs away' was harmful to the fish and they should stop. This type of discipline has the advantage of being self-enforcing. Students police each other and remind those who stray of the social contract they all agreed to. Hundreds of little pushes like this throughout a student's career lead to high school students who, should the need arise due to a teacher's absence, can be left alone to study quietly for a day and not have them descend into (loud) anarchy. We often hear about the evils of peer pressure but this is largely because it has been ignored how it might be used in a positive manner to enforce positive behavior.

Next time I delve into student leadership and responsibility. 

UPDATE: It appears I am not the first to consider this idea. A paper was published by Queens University which goes into
much more detail than I ever could. Link

The problems facing Canada's First Nations are many and longstanding. Some of these problems are structural. Band
leadership often has to deal with all the considerations of a province while dealing with federal red tape which renders
even capable ministers overwhelmed (and politics has shown us that our leaders can't always be capable administrators).
Having to seek permission from Ottawa for major projects further prevents effective leadership. Further, First Nations
have difficulty if the government at the federal level is hostile or simply ambivalent. 

While letting my mind wander I happened to become curious how much reserve land there was in Canada. That, and
other questions led me to an idea that may well solve some of the more intractable problems facing First Nations. The reserves scattered across Canada should be reorganized into a new province.

First, the numbers...

Reserves in Canada cover 3,377,826 hectares, or 33,778.26 km2. By comparison Prince Edward Island is only 5,685.73 km2, These reserves have 360,620 residents. PEI has 140,204 residents (give or take Mike Duffy depending on the outcome of his trial). So from a purely size-based assessment such a province isn't unreasonable. Given how the court cases in British Columbia have been going it is likely the total size of reserves are going to increase before all is said and done. Economic numbers are hard to find for Canada's reserves but more on this as we go.

Advantages for First Nations...

The courts have repeatedly acknowledged that First Nations have a right to be consulted about how their land is used.
Some Natives have also insisted a place at the table during constitutional negotiations. The provinces are often unsure
how to approach dealing with First Nations as they are not a 'provincial issue'. Having provincial status solves these
problems. As a province they would a) be consulted about activities within provincial boundaries, b) need to be consulted about any potential constitutional changes, and c) finally have a clear relationship with the other provinces.

As a province they could reasonably expect their influence to grow in Parliament as they would gain seats in both the Senate and the Commons (Canada does not create ridings that cross provincial boundaries). But more than that the new province would be the only one with a realistic claim to having a national focus. The provinces have provincial attitudes in the worst sense of the word. This new province will be in a strong position to understand and mediate between regional and national concerns.

Currently, monetary transfers to reserves are the discretion of the federal government. In fact just today the claim was made that First Nations schools have become underfunded. The Equalization payments (which in all likelihood would replace current funding in the new First Nations province) are also done at the federal government's discretion. The difference is that if the federal government cuts Equalization payments the provinces raise hell. In short the funding is more secure for a province.  

The First Nations could also finally make use of the economy of scale. All of the different band governments handling the same issues could be concentrated into one provincial government. This First Nations province would be in the enviable position of having more well-trained administrators than there would be positions to fill. The various reserve governments may shrink in importance but perhaps not to the level of being mere town councils. Indeed, there is an argument for having stronger municipal government for issues where it can do the most good.

Perhaps most importantly, Canada's First Nations would be in control of their own destiny. There would still be problems
to be solved but the solutions would for the first time be coming from First Nations themselves.  

Advantages for the Federal Government...

The size of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs will be able to be greatly downsized and perhaps scrapped altogether.

A perennial and intractable portfolio will no longer get passed from government to government with marginal progress being made. It is possible that the Indian Act might (finally) be repealed.

Gaining a province inclined towards having a national point of view may give the federal government an important ally among the provinces.

Advantages for the Provinces...

For the same reason this new province would have greater influence with the federal government it would have greater pull with the provinces. The provincial premiers are not known for working together or having a particularly strong understanding of the struggles other provinces have to deal with. By necessity this new province would. It may well become the go-to mediator between provinces. And this would be advantageous to all the provinces. 

Final Thoughts

A province made up of Canada's First Nations reserves would be the single biggest change in relations between Canada and its First Nations since the passing of the Indian Act. Accomplishing this change would be difficult. Canada very much has a status quo-enforcing constitution. Some among the First Nations, the provincial premiers, and federal MPs might have objections. But in my view this is the best way forward for everyone. 
   

I received a link to this site from The Friends of the Reform Act. It is essentially a site to crowd source the top 100 ideas for
improving Canadian democracy (there is a separate effort for the USA). So far they are halfway to 100 ideas. Not
surprisingly electoral & Senate reform dominate the proposals but a little bit of everything has been covered so far. The intention is to publish a book of the most popular ideas. 

Since I like this sort of collaborative effort I figured I'd let people know about it. I also put forward my own idea for how
we might fix the electoral system. 

Note: An earlier version of this article had a calculation error in regards to the Bloc Quebecois. I have corrected it and added additional information in italics regarding calculating voting power.

I have been posting about electoral reform for a while now. Mostly this has been concerning a new system I devised which I named the Bennett Method. I applied it to the results of the recent provincial election but the flaws were already becoming evident. The results just refused to move as close to proportionality as I would like. Re-tooling was in order it was clear.

After some thought I decided to fix what was a major inconvenience of the original idea; its complexity. The original idea had three main objectives. 1.  Decouple voting power in Parliament from seat totals and align it with the popular vote.
2. Reward MPs who secured proportional higher vote totals in their ridings. 3. Keep as much of the current system in
place as possible. I have come to realize the second objective would have to be abandoned in the interest of simplicity.

So what does the Bennett Method 2.0 look like? So glad you asked.

Like the previous version this method keeps the First-past-the-post system largely intact. Voters still cast a single vote in a single-member constituency. The candidate who receives the most votes still becomes the MP. But in place of the next several convoluted mathematical steps there is but one: Give each MP a vote proportion to their party's share of the
popular vote.

The formula would be Popular Vote / # of MPs in party = Voting share of each MP.

I would like to draw your attention to the 2011 Federal Election. The Conservative Party won 166 seats (53.89%) with
39.62% of the popular vote. The NDP won 103 seats (33.44%) with 30.63% of the popular vote. The Liberals won 34 seats (11.03%) with 18.91% of the popular vote. The Bloc won 4 seats (1.29%) with 6.04% of the popular vote. Finally the Green
Party won a single seat (0.32%) with 3.91% of the popular vote. Using my system each Conservative MP would have a vote valued at 0.23, each NDP MP vote valued at 0.29, each Liberal vote valued at 0.55, each Bloc vote valued at 1.51, and the single Green vote valued at 3.91. 
Voting power in Parliament under the proposed system:
Conservative voting power: 38.18
Liberal voting power: 18.7
New Democrat voting power: 29.87
Bloc voting power: 6.04
Green voting power: 3.91
As a result the FPTP electoral system will have been rendered mostly proportional.

Some eagle-eyed readers may note that the totals above do not equal 100%. This is true. For starters only 99.11% of the popular vote went to parties who won seats. So were did the remaining 3% that is missing go? I think this is due to not rounding numbers on my part. I will do so now. Below are the new voting power totals (with MP share rounded and in brackets):
Conservative voting power: (0.24) 39.84
Liberal voting power: (0.56) 19.04
New Democrat voting power: (0.30) 30.09
Bloc voting power: (1.51) 6.04
Green voting power: (3.91) 3.91
Again, slightly off at 98.92% which is better than the previous 96.7%. But in either case does this matter? As a percentage of 96.7 the Conservatives totals of 38.18 is 39.48%. If rounding is included 39.84 is 40.27. For the NDP it works out to 30.88% & 30.41% respectively. The Liberal totals come to 19.33% & 19.24%. In all three cases it would seem that rounding to the second decimal place provides little in the way of overall change to voting power. Only in the tightest of minority situations would it even matter. As such, not rounding the totals is acceptable. 

Advantages of the system I have proposed:
-The voting system does not change at all for Canadian voters.
-It is as understandable and simple as FPTP is.
-It renders the House of Commons mostly proportional.
-It is no more expensive than FPTP is.
-It benefits (or at least does not harm) all of the main political parties in different ways.
-It makes votes for parties in ridings where they will never win matter.

Now, this system is not perfect. It should also be noted that votes for parties that do not win a seat still do not count.
What's more, large numbers of such votes can mess with the math unless explicitly excluded (which I did not do
here). At the federal level this should not be an issue since such parties generally receive less than 1% of votes cast. The
Green Party's high of 6% being somewhat acceptable as well.

So how would things like confidence votes and picking a Speaker work? Surprisingly well as it turns out.

Picking a Speaker (and other scenarios)- Under the current system picking a Speaker lowers the vote total of his or her party. However, under this system I foresee a rule that states the voting power is recalculated at the beginning of each day. In short a Speaker would simply have to drop his party affiliation and his party's total would not be affected. Likewise, re-calculating the numbers each day means vacant seats would not affect a party's total (which they currently do). I would not extend this rule to MPs who end up as independents for one reason or another due to potential loophole abuse. At the same time, poaching MPs from other parties will no longer be advantageous as having more MPs will not mean more voting power.

Forming a Government- While voting power should be based on popular vote I feel the formation of governments should remain based on seat count. The reasons are simple: regional representation and a larger talent pool to draw on.

Confidence Votes- I would keep explicit confidence motions and the Speech from the Throne as being based on seat totals but have all other legislation based on voting power.

Concluding Remarks
As I have repeated often, I don't think this is a perfect system. I do however think I am making it better. As a means of distinguishing this system from the original idea I have decided to call it Single Member-Proportional Vote. 

On December 4th & 5th representatives of the Pirate Party of Canada attended a meeting hosted by Elections Canada to discuss new rules and regulations resulting from recent changes to the Elections Act. At the meeting party member Ric Lim presented the CEO of Elections Canada with a letter outlining commonsense changes that the party feels need to be made in how independent candidates are treated. The full text of the letter is below:

I wrote an article a number of months back about a modified first-past-the-post (FPTP) system I called the Bennett Method. The results of the 2014 New Brunswick Election provides a good opportunity to revisit whether this method is a viable improvement to our electoral democracy.

First, a quick review. The Bennett method differs from other electoral systems in that it doesn't mess with ridings, voting method, or even how those votes are counted. Instead it changes what those votes mean in the resulting legislature by changing the relative strength of the elected official's vote. For example, an MLA who won their riding with a large majority and belonged to a party that had high support would have a stronger vote in the resulting legislature than an MLA who barely got elected and who's party ended up not having much support. The end result being that while seat counts would remain the same as if we were using FPTP the actual party strength would closer to being proportional to their popular vote.

So. Let's get started.

The first thing to do is to consider each riding as being 'worth' 100 points (ie. 100 percent). These 'points' are awarded to MLAs based on the percentage of the vote they won in their riding. For instance Brian Keirstead won 40.61% of the vote in his riding of Albert. His point total would be 40.61. The remaining points don't go away and I will return to them momentarily. There are 49 ridings in New Brunswick so therefore the maximum number of points in play is 4900.

Results for New Brunswick:

PARTY RIDING TOTALS (NDP & PANB not included due to not winning seats)                                                                             

Progressive Conservative Party:    
47.45, 42.00, 38.65, 52.53, 40.61, 44.27, 49.86, 38.74, 51.35, 45.24, 48.90, 39.18, 35.66, 41.97, 28.79, 40.95, 35.42, 35.21, 46.53, 56.77, 48.16
Liberal Party:    
57.54, 61.86, 53.54, 62.53, 61.28, 56.51, 45.71, 64.40, 49.04, 49.70, 49.78, 48.55, 64.39, 59.85, 45.43, 65.77, 44.90, 52.75, 44.83, 37.01, 32.19, 62.47, 41.72, 33.60, 40.83, 49.62, 56.39
Green Party:    
30.68                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                              
TOTAL: 2331.11    

2331.11 is the total number of points awarded to the all winning candidates in New Brunswick. It is somewhat less than half of the point total due to some very close races and a strong third-party vote. The remaining 2568.89 points are now to be dealt with. These points are divided equally among the candidates of each party based on that party's share of the popular vote.

Progressive Conservative Party:
889.86 (34.64%)
Liberal Party: 
1097.42 (42.72%) 
Green Party:  
169.80 ( 6.61%)

Divided between the candidates this results in each Progressive Conservative MLA receiving an additional 42.37 points. The Liberal MLAs each receive 40.64 additional points. The Green MLA takes his full total of 169.80 additional points.

Riding totals after unused points were distributed:

Progressive Conservative Party: 
89.82, 84.37, 81.02, 94.90, 82.98, 86.64, 92.23, 81.11, 93.72, 87.61, 91.27, 81.55, 78.03, 84.34, 71.16, 83.32, 77.79, 77.58, 88.90, 99.14, 90.53                
Liberal Party:  
98.18, 102.05, 94.18, 103.17, 101.92, 97.15, 86.35, 105.04, 89.68, 90.34, 90.42, 89.19, 105.03, 100.49, 86.07, 106.41, 85.54, 93.39, 85.47, 77.65, 72.83, 103.11, 82.36, 74.24, 81.47, 90.26, 97.03
Green Party:  
200.48           

The total strength of the Progressive Conservative vote is 1798.01, Liberals 2489.02, and Greens 200.48. Total of all three parties is 4487.51 (you may notice the total is short by roughly 412. This is likely due to the number of people who voted for either the NDP or PANB).

Voting power of MLAs as a percentage of 4487.51:

PC: 40.06% 
LIB: 55.46%                
GRN:  4.46%
 
Distortion between voting power and percentage of the popular vote received in FPTP and Bennett Method:

The Liberal voting power was actually 0.36 points more distorted but this is off-set by the overall results being 4.85 closer in terms of voting power vs. popular vote. This is a known error that last occured when I looked at Nova Scotia's results. I don't currently have a good explanation as to why it sometimes occures. It could be that large numbers of votes for parties that don't win seats is the cause of the distortion (in the Nova Scotia test the Greens did pretty well). If, so it could be fixed by giving a seat to party leaders whose party gets X% of the vote.

So what if they were included?

If the leaders of the NDP and People's Alliance were each given a seat and a vote share based on their popular vote the numbers would look like this (using the 412.49 points that we are short and adjusting to be out of the full 4900):

PC: 1798.01 (36.69%)
LIB: 2489.02 (50.79%)              
GRN:  200.48 ( 4.09%)
PA:   67.97 ( 1.38%)
NDP:  344.51 ( 7.03%)

In this case all parties moved towards proportionality. While the Liberals still have a slim majority in this case (which their popular vote doesn't support) it drops to a minority once they pick a speaker.

Pros & Cons

-Nothing changes for voters or Elections New Brunswick staff. Everyone still has one vote to cast and, as a result, they can be counted the same way they always have been.
-It doesn't require extra ridings be created and only requires a few new seats if the optional method is used.
-It is, if not perfectly proportional, at least closer than what we have now.
-It eliminates most wasted votes by having votes for candidates not only weaken the winner of that riding but also increase the strength of the party elsewheres.
-There is some basic math involved but it doesn't inconvenience either the voters or those counting the votes.
-It weakens independent MLAs somewhat since they will never benefit from a party's popular vote share.

I'll close with my standard disclaimer: I don't claim this is a great system. I don't even claim it is a good system. I only claim it is an interesting system.

Thoughts? Suggestions?

The Pirate Party leadership has been busy working to construct a platform for 2015 over the last year and a half. The creation of the platform is a three step process involving policy submissions by members and the general public, editing by the party leadership, and a party-wide vote to confirm a policy as part of the official platform. The following policies are the first batch that has been approved by the Political Council and will be sent to the membership to be voted on in the near future:

Fairness for Independents
-We propose allowing independent candidates to raise funds in the two months leading up to a scheduled general election provided the candidate submits the names of their official agent and their auditor to Elections Canada beforehand.  Should the independent candidate receive a party’s nomination, they must hand over all money raised during this period to Elections Canada.  All funds will be subject to the same reporting rules as those raised during the election itself.
-Additionally, we propose a new system by which money raised by independent candidates before the end of an election will instead be held in trust by Elections Canada until the next Federal election. If the person runs again as an independent candidate, the money that is held in trust will be returned to them for use in their campaign. If the person decides not to run at all or runs  as a candidate under a party banner, the money held in trust will be forfeited to Elections Canada in whole. All interest accrued from money held by Elections Canada in this manner will belong to Elections Canada. 
-Finally, we would reinstate the ability of independent MPs to introduce significant amendments at a bills report stage.  As independent MPs do not currently get a vote on committees, this would allow for a more fair playing field.

There has been general agreement to start with policies that have wide agreement in the party and work our way outwards from there. The Fairness for Independents & Unbundle Technology sections represent two such natural outgrowths from existing party beliefs. 

Many policies remain to be reviewed and it will take dedicated work to have the platform ready by the end of the year. Some policies had to be rejected but this is a normal part of policy development. Canadian Federalism presents a unique challenge in that some areas near and dear to the Pirate heart cannot be adequately addressed at the federal level. The entire process is a learning experience and I look forward to carrying the project to completion.

Q & A

Where are the privacy protection, patent reform, open government, etc policies?
None of the previous policies from 2011 were 'grandfathered in' to the 2015 platform. That is to say, everything is being re-examined. Since the policies mentioned are fairly fundamental to party identity they will end up in the final document in some form, we simply haven't gotten to them yet.

Why didn't you leave policy creation up to the membership? / why did you have the leadership assume a primary role?
Policy development is a tricky business and we wanted a dedicated group involved to make sure the process didn't flounder. There is also the issue involving popular policies that a federal party has little ability to create policy on. We have tried to keep the policy development process as open as possible by having an extended period where members could submit policies (still on-going) and by giving them the final say on whether a policy is adopted.

I saw X policy on the website I really liked but now it has disappeared. What happened? 
Most likely the policy was rejected by the leadership and hidden from view. The discussion page for all policies (rejected, accepted, and yet to be looked at) can be found on the Party Forum. A document listing rejected policies may be released at a later date but for now you can assume it was a policy that fell outside the federal mandate (since this has been the most common reason for rejecting a policy).

With the Supreme Court of Canada's recent ruling on the logistics of Senate reform Prime Minister Stephen Harper has nixed the idea. Basically he has proclaimed reform to be too much of a bother to deal with. Given Harper's dislike for having to negotiate its not a surprising stance for him but any prime minister would likely hesitate to move forward given the circumstances. The fact is that Canada is really, really bad at doing constitutional reform. The issue is mainly one of focus: the provinces see any attempt at reforming the constitution to be a chance to leverage their own interests. The reform bloats until eventually someone walks away from the whole mess. We would be better at this if we could keep the discussion to the one issue we actually want to handle. So how do we do that?

Despite the Premier of Saskatchewan stating that not even a referendum would help Senate reform to move forward there is a way that it could. Senate reform remains hugely popular among Canadians. What needs to be done is to leverage that support for reform and use it to counteract the provinces interests in addressing every issue they have with our constitution. You do this by crafting the referendum question in a particular way:

"Do you support the federal and provincial governments entering into negotiations to amend only the sections of the constitution that deal with the Canadian Senate?"

Premiers are not idiots. If 75% of voters in their province don't want them going off-topic they won't. Abolishment would still be hard to do, as it should, but there would be a real chance to negotiate reform. Requiring 7 provinces representing 50% of the population leaves plenty of wiggle room once the fear of another Meech Lake is removed.

Recently the Maclean's Magazine website posted an article going over the pros and cons of ending vouching. At roughly the same time I read this article the CBC reported on the Speaker's precedent-setting ruling on Rathgeber's bill. As I scrolled through the comment section (this is highly unadvised for anyone with
stress issues) I noticed that most felt the Speaker was acting impartial "for once". That a position whose entire existence relies on being impartial is not seen that way is a concern to me. It concerns me even more that the methods by which we chose the Speaker may make such views valid. The idea struck me that perhaps the two issues could each be used to solve the other.

In the 2011 Federal Election 120,171 people were vouched for. Remember for later that this is a number of voters roughly equivalent to a single riding. The government's argument, as delivered by Pierre Poilievre, is that "Every citizen is entitled to the voting franchise. Let us never forget that a fraudulent vote has the same mathematical effect as denying someone their constitutional right to cast a ballot. It cancels out the ballot of an honest person". While it pains me to say that Mr. Poilievre is right about anything. In this narrow instance he is. However, rashly jumping straight to the elimination of vouching is un-conservative and, moreover, harmful to democracy in that it will also deny legitimate voters their rights.

People who are vouched for should be allowed to vote but to mollify any concerns about illegitimate votes being cast perhaps instead we can modify what position they are voting for. Let us look at the Speaker of the House of Commons
for a second. The Speaker is chosen by and from MPs to occupy their position. A Speaker can neither propose legislation nor vote (except to break a tie and in this case convention dictates the Speaker should vote to continue debate). This leaves a Speaker's riding without effective representation in the House of Commons. Furthermore, since MPs elect the Speaker they have a tendency to be from the governing party. This leaves the 'referee' open to charges of not being
impartial. Interestingly, the Speakers in the British House of Commons sit and run as independents. This tradition did not carry over to Canada and an attempted revival a few years back failed to last. It is an ad hoc solution to the impartiality issue anyways.

So what am I proposing exactly? I am simply proposing that:
-Vouching continues as normal, although refinements should be encouraged.
-Anyone who is vouched for does not vote for the MP of their riding but for a Speaker candidate.

This scheme would balance the rights of Canadians to have a say in the outcome of an election with having the assurance that your MP is legitimately the one who should have been elected. This is not a small concern. While the number of vouched candidates above is less than 1% of the total electors who voted; in Canada elections can be devilishly close. While vouched electors would not be voting for a candidate that could propose or vote on laws they would be voting to elect a candidate with responsibilities arguably of equal importance: impartial dealing with all parties, maintaining decorum, disciplining MPs, and acting as the parties' go-between.

If there are issues with vouching (and I feel there are albeit on a much smaller scale than the government believes) this scheme would remove any irregularities to a single position. What's more, should we have an election where very few people need to be vouched for (for the sake of argument lets say under 10,000) we can simply have the Commons use the old method instead.  
 
There are issues to iron out (as there is with any idea). For starters we would have to decide whether parties could run candidates or whether Speaker candidates must be independents. Related to the previous issue is how these candidates would make the voting public aware of their qualifications and stances. Finally, it is an unanswered question whether such a change would lead to the Speaker being a more partisan position. The last point might be addressed by making the Speaker removable by MPs with a 2/3rds vote with the Speaker's replacement selected by the current method. Humourously, the Speaker's position ended up in the Canadian Constitution so an amendment would be needed (luckily not one that would require consulting the provinces).

What are your thoughts on this idea and the issues it tries to solve?